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Abstract: I argue for a novel understanding of the nature of agent-regret. On the 
standard picture, agent-regret involves regretting the result of one’s action and thus 
regretting one’s action. I argue that the standard picture is a flawed analysis of agent-
regret. I offer several cases of agent-regret where the agent feels agent-regret but 
does not regret the result itself. I appeal to other cases where an agent’s attitude 
towards something depends upon whether or not they are involved in that thing. I 
argue that the same applies to actions: sometimes an agent’s attitude towards a 
result differs from their attitude to their involvement in bringing about that result. 
Agent-regret is regret about my own action, but it need not involve regret about 
something in the world. I end by considering how this picture of agent-regret allows 
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‘[T]he evil which is done without design should be regarded as a 
misfortune to the doer as well as to the sufferer.’ 
Adam Smith (1982, p. II.iii.3.4) 
 
Sometimes, through no fault of our own, we do something that we regret. We do not 
simply regret what has happened, we regret what we have done. This is what Bernard 
Williams called ‘agent-regret’, and the classic example is the lorry driver who, whilst 
driving perfectly carefully, hits and kills a child and regrets that he killed the child 
(Nagel, 1979, pp. 28–29; B. Williams, 1981, p. 28). We can also find agent-regret in 
more mundane cases like when you accidentally smash a vase (Wolf, 2001, p. 14). 
You might be carrying it and slip or brush against it in a corridor, and you regret that 
you smashed the vase. Just as with spilling another person’s pint, dropping some wine 
on a white couch, or bumping someone to the floor as you both round the corner, 
this can lead to agent-regret. Agent-regret is an emotion that is both widespread in its 
mundane form, and deep and harrowing when it arises over, say, killing a child.  
In this paper, I argue for a novel understanding of agent-regret. On the standard 
picture of agent-regret, agent-regret involves regretting the result of one’s action and 
thus regretting one’s action. The careful lorry driver who hits a child regrets that the 
child has been harmed (or worse), recognises that his actions caused the harm, and 
moves to regretting that his actions caused that harm. I argue that this standard picture 
is flawed; it omits genuine, and interesting, cases of agent-regret and clouds our 
understanding of that emotion.  
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I argue that there are explanations other than the fact that one regrets the result that 
might explain why one regrets one’s own action; the standard picture offers only one 
of these explanations. The need for alternative explanations is made clear when we 
see that someone can feel agent-regret without regretting the result of their action. As 
I will show, I might regret my action that harmed you but not regret that you were 
harmed. I illustrate such cases and suggest some explanations of why we might regret 
what we have done without feeling ordinary regret about the result. I do not aim to 
fully defend our propensity to feel agent-regret, but I will defend the propriety of 
agent-regret against one potential criticism in the final section of this paper. 
1. Agent-Regret 
How do we distinguish agent-regret from ordinary regret? Return to the example of 
the careful lorry driver. Williams noted that a bystander might experience ordinary 
regret over what happened; anyone who thinks such a thing was lamentable might 
regret it (B. Williams, 1981, p. 27). We can even regret actions or agency without 
feeling agent-regret: the driver might regret the actions of the child who ran into the 
road, or the lorry driver’s friend might regret that the lorry driver killed someone.2 
There are forms of regret that are not agent-regret. Agent-regret has a far more 
specific object. What is central to agent-regret is that only the agent can think ‘I wish 
I hadn’t done that’.3 Only the driver can lie awake at night and think ‘I regret killing 
the child’. Someone who feels agent-regret has the self-referential thought ‘I regret 
 
2 For the driver who regrets the child’s action, see Scarre (2017, p. 577). A driver who regrets the 
child’s actions is akin to the javelin thrower who regrets that the boy ran in front of his javelin 
(Williams, 2008, pp. 61–62). The important point for our purposes is that they do not feel agent-
regret, but ordinary regret about someone’s action. 
3 Agent-regret can also extend to omissions: it is agency rather than ‘action’ that is central. I will not 
discuss this, although everything I say here should extend to omissions.  
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that I did it’ (Baron, 1988, p. 261; Gaita, 2004, p. 53; Sussman, 2018, p. 794; B. 
Williams, 1981, p. 27). 
Guilt also takes one’s own action as its object. Agent-regret is distinct from guilt 
insofar as guilt involves fault, whereas agent-regret need not (B. Williams, 1981, p. 
28). We can proceed with a rough understanding of what ‘fault’ means. The driver 
wasn’t at fault because he was driving carefully; on the other hand, a speeding driver 
or a drunk driver would have been at fault. When you smashed the vase, it was just 
an accident; had you been juggling the vase or running through the corridor, you 
would have been at fault. Yet some accounts of agent-regret hold that to feel agent-
regret one must think that one was, or might have been, at fault (Blackburn, 2015, p. 
222; Enoch & Marmor, 2007, p. 419; Jacobson, 2013, p. 114; Rosebury, 1995, pp. 
512–517; Wallace, 2013, p. 44). I deny that this is true.4 The details of this need not 
detain us, but, on my understanding, someone who was not at fault but incorrectly 
thinks they were at fault feels guilt. It strikes me that the lorry driver can quickly affirm 
that he was not at fault and that he was driving safely; still, I take it that he can feel 
differently from a bystander and feel agent-regret. The characters I will introduce do 
not think they were at fault, so are firmly in the realm of agent-regret. 
Agent-regret is an emotion that involves regretting that I have done something, 
but I need not regard myself as at fault for having done it. 
I want to draw our attention to one further feature of agent-regret. One feels agent-
regret because of what happens. What happens affects what one has done. Let me 
explain this a little. The result of killing the child is the dead child.5 Results are 
 
4 For a clear account of why we should not be persuaded that agent-regret involves thinking one was 
(or might have been) at fault, see MacKenzie, (2017, pp. 98–99). 
5 Whereas a consequence of killing the child is the driver’s mental anguish, the damage to his lorry, 
and so on. For more on this distinction see Gardner (2018, pp. 58–59) and von Wright (1963, chap. 
3). Consequences can also lead to our regretting what we have done. My account can be extended in 
various ways to account for this, but I will not discuss consequences in much depth in this paper. 
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outcomes (roughly: things in the world)6 that affect the constitution of actions: the 
death of the child affects what action the driver has performed. The death of the child 
means that we can say that not only did the driver drive, not only did he hit someone, 
but he killed someone. Had the outcome merely been that the child was injured by 
the driver, then the driver’s action could not possibly be ‘killing’. This picture might 
be complicated in various ways, but for my purposes we just need to see that in many 
cases, outcomes affect what action has been performed. As Thomas Nagel (1979, pp. 
29–30) put it, ‘how things turn out determines what he has done’. 
In these cases, one only feels agent-regret because of the result. The drunk driver can 
feel guilty merely for driving drunk.7  But when it comes to our cases of agent-regret, 
the driver only has reason to feel anything if the bad result arises – he only has a 
reason to feel agent-regret because the child dies – and that’s because he regrets his 
action (and not any associated fault). Without the result, there is no regrettable action; 
there is no smashing or killing, there’s just walking down the corridor or going for a 
drive (B. Williams, 1981, pp. 23–26). 
I will suggest that although results are central to one performing a particular action, 
one does not have to regret the result itself to feel agent-regret. To feel agent-regret 
about smashing your vase I must regret smashing your vase, and, for me to smash 
your vase, your vase must smash; nonetheless, I need not regret that your vase 
smashed. The shards strewn over the floor might not bother me.  
 
6 One could also think of this as an event (the child dying) or a state (the child being dead). 
7 Some cases of agent-regret, such as Williams’s Gauguin’s figure, might involve fault; but agent-regret, 
unlike guilt, does not attach only to faulty actions. It seems that Gauguin might feel guilty over 
abandoning his family and also feel agent-regret over this depending on how well his project goes. The 
result (whether he becomes a painter or a failure) determines whether he feels agent-regret. I will 
discuss only cases that are free of fault. 
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Before moving on to this, I need to address a complication. We seem to find agent-
regret in two kinds of case (Baron, 1988, sec. 3.2; de Wijze, 2005). The cases I discuss 
involve bad luck: the driver is driving along and out of nowhere comes a child. They 
are the sort of case where we might not foresee anything bad happening. In the other 
sort of case, whatever one does is lamentable, and one knows it ahead of time. This 
is where dilemmas and hard choices arise. This is what happens in the case of 
Agamemnon, torn between sacrificing his daughter Iphigenia or abandoning his war 
(and risking the starvation of his troops) (B. Williams, 1973b, p. 173). I will not 
discuss these cases in depth. For one, much of the literature on agent-regret focusses 
on cases like the lorry driver, and cases like Agamemnon’s receive a different 
treatment. I suspect that is because cases like Agamemnon’s are complicated by the 
presence of a choice to knowingly do something that one will regret, which introduces 
further issues, such as dirty hands. This introduces complications that distract from 
my main argument, so I will not explicitly discuss dilemma cases, though my analysis 
should (with the necessary changes) extend to them.   
2. Purity 
One way of incorporating the role of results into an analysis of agent-regret is to note 
that often agent-regret involves regretting the result of one’s action. That is to say, the 
agent sees the result as a bad thing independently of her involvement. Were the lorry 
driver just a bystander then we imagine he would feel ordinary regret. The lorry driver 
doesn’t just regret that he killed the child, he also regrets that the child died.  
On this picture – the standard picture in discussions of agent-regret – regretting the 
result is a constitutive part of agent-regret. John Gardner (2018, p. 139) presents the 
standard picture clearly: ‘I regret the injury to the child who ran out in front of my 
lorry, and on top of that I hold myself to have been responsible for it. Then, naturally 
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enough, I also regret the fact of my responsibility. My pained thoughts include not 
just ‘if only the lad hadn’t run out’ but also ‘if only I had gone for a different route 
this morning’ (or a smaller truck, earlier start, etc.).’ On Gardner’s picture, we regret 
the result we are responsible for and that regret transmits across to become regret 
about what we have done.  
The Standard Picture: In feeling agent-regret, an agent assesses the result as 
regrettable, and she recognises her responsibility for the result in virtue of her 
action, thus she comes to see her action as regrettable.8 
The standard picture offers a plausible evaluative explanation of many cases of agent-
regret: the agent regrets their action because the result is itself regrettable. Yet the 
standard picture builds this evaluative explanation into the nature of agent-regret. It 
says that to feel agent-regret always is to see one’s action as bad because one sees the 
result as bad.  
This is not part of the nature of agent-regret. I will argue that the correct account of 
the nature of agent-regret allows room for alternative evaluative explanations and the 
standard picture fails as an account of agent-regret because there are cases of agent-
regret that do not involve lamenting the result of one’s action. These cases are pure: 
one regrets what one has done yet this cannot be explained by one’s independent 
regret (e.g. where one would feel ordinary regret were one a bystander) about the 
result. 
 
8 This view seems to be presupposed in much of the literature. Here are two further examples: ‘agent-
regret concerns what for the agent is a valuable alternative, even though she did not or could not 
choose it’ (emphasis in original) (Bagnoli, 2000, p. 177). ‘The emotional response to beliefs about the 
badness of the effects of one's actions is what Bernard Williams labeled 'agent-regret' (Wolf, 2001, p. 
16). See also Tannenbaum in note 21 below. 
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In pure cases of agent-regret, one regrets one’s action but does not regret the 
result itself.9 
This means that we need to adopt a new picture of agent-regret. 
The Simple Picture: In feeling agent-regret, an agent assesses what she has 
done as regrettable.  
The simple picture just says that agent-regret involves regretting what you have done, 
it does not build in a particular evaluative explanation, so it allows for pure cases. 
More broadly, it pushes us to understand why agency matters, aside from our 
assessments of results.  
I will now do two things. Firstly, I will sketch some pure cases; then in the next section, 
I will offer some evaluative explanations of pure cases, some explanations of why an 
agent might think what she has done is regrettable without thinking the result itself is 
regrettable.  
The two cases I start with are fairly extreme and far from commonplace, yet they 
vividly illustrate agent-regret where an agent doesn’t regret the result itself.10 After 
sketching these, I will offer a few more mundane examples. In our first example, we 
encounter a rifleman in a firing squad. He is a keen marksman and is drafted via a 
fair lottery, that he willingly partakes in, to execute a notorious convict.11 After the 
 
9 As I noted above, I will not discuss in any depth cases like Agamemnon’s. But my analysis applies 
just as much to those cases: what Agamemnon regrets is being responsible for Iphigenia’s death, and 
we can imagine variant cases where he doesn’t care about her death but does care about his killing her 
himself.  
10 Amelie Rorty notes this possibility, but she does not go into any depth on its role in agent-regret: 
‘Characteristically, the agent regrets his action because he regrets the state of affairs to which it has 
contributed. But it is possible for a person to regret his having brought about E, without regretting E. 
(He may, for instance, think it is important for someone else to enjoy the satisfaction of having brought 
about E.)’ (Rorty, 1980, p. 490). See also 493-494. 
11 The case is fictional, but is based on elements of real cases, as in the below discussion of dummy 
bullets. It should be clear that I do not endorse the rifleman’s viewpoints, and the example is meant 
to be fictionalised (and perhaps backdated a century or two).  
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killing, he does not regret that the convict was killed by a firing squad—he believes 
this convict deserved to die at the hands of the state. He does not see the result itself 
as regrettable. Yet he feels agent-regret. Why? Because he regrets that he killed the 
convict. He sees something regrettable in his doing the deed.  
The rifleman in a firing squad wants the convict to be executed, but he regrets 
that he killed the convict.  
This example is built out of a genuine practice from which it derives its plausibility: 
the dummy bullet. Firing squads often have one gun loaded with a blank cartridge or 
a wax bullet, but no rifleman knows who has the dummy. Thus, one rifleman (the 
one with the dummy) did not in fact contribute to the convict’s death and each other 
rifleman might be able to deceive himself into thinking that he did not fire a fatal 
bullet and that he had the dummy. 12  In theory, the riflemen can each absolve 
themselves of responsibility. This practice doesn’t make sense if what the members 
of the firing squad might regret is the state-sanctioned execution of the convict. 
Including a blank makes sense only if they might regret what they each have done: 
that is, their own role in killing the convict. Unfortunately for him, our rifleman knows 
he fired a fatal bullet. He regrets killing the convict. 
The rifleman case strikes me as both interesting and plausible. It helps to motivate 
the idea that there are cases of pure agent-regret. But if you are not convinced, a 
second example makes an even stronger case against the standard picture of agent-
regret because it keeps the basic structure of the lorry driver’s case. If you accept the 
basic cases of agent-regret, this case should pressure you into thinking that the 
 
12 Apparently, experienced marksmen can sometimes tell that they have a blank, due to a difference 
in recoil. But each rifleman could persuade himself that the recoil was less than normal and come to 
deceive himself into thinking he fired a blank. 
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evaluative story can be more complicated than as presented by the standard picture. 
Think about the celebrations of some people following Margaret Thatcher’s death 
(Neild, 2013). Or take Bob Dylan’s (1963) attitude towards warmongers in his 
‘Masters of War’: ‘And I hope that you die/And your death’ll come soon/ I will follow 
your casket/ In the pale afternoon/And I’ll watch while you’re lowered/Down to your 
deathbed/And I’ll stand o’er your grave/’Til I’m sure that you’re dead.’ It should be 
clear that sometimes we do not regret, and actively welcome, the deaths of certain 
people. Certainly, some of these celebrating figures would still be filled with joy were 
they to discover that, say, Thatcher or a warmonger had been hit by a lorry. They 
might even take a lionizing attitude towards the driver, seeing him as some sort of 
inadvertent hero. Clearly, they won’t necessarily regret the death of this hated figure 
just because someone (inadvertently) killed them. 
Combine this attitude with the lorry driver and we get our case. We can easily imagine 
that were our lorry driver Bob Dylan, and were our victim a warmonger, Dylan would 
be wracked with agent-regret even though he would have been delighted had the 
warmonger died in some other way or with another driver at the wheel. Our 
fictionalized Bob Dylan feels no regret about the death of the warmonger - he 
positively relishes it - but feels agent-regret because he killed the warmonger. 
The hate-filled driver detests a particular individual. He has regularly, and 
ingenuously, wished death upon this person. He then, accidentally, runs this 
person over. The driver regrets killing the victim. 
What the rifleman and the hate-filled driver show us is that we can feel agent-regret 
despite not regretting the result: the death.  
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Although these cases might seem to be extreme, we can also imagine more mundane 
examples of pure agent-regret: I might not regret that you broke your nose (I don’t 
much like you and find your vanity annoying) but I regret that it’s because I ran into 
you; I might not regret that your secret was spilled (your behaviour towards your 
spouse was appalling) but I regret that I inadvertently divulged it; I might not regret 
that your vase smashed (it’s an eyesore on our mantelpiece) but I regret that I tripped 
and knocked it over. These are not the most common cases of agent-regret, but they 
are the purest: they are pure because they are unmingled with other forms of regret 
and thus the object of agent-regret is most clear. One regrets what one has done, and 
this need not connect (evaluatively) to regretting the result.  
I now want to address some challenges to these cases. One possibility is that the 
rifleman realises that he does care about the death of the convict, and his (causal, but 
also spatial) proximity to the convict’s death helps reveal this to him. If this is true, 
then agent-regret would still depend upon regretting the result. I do not deny that 
sometimes agent-regret can reveal to us what we care about (Arpaly, 2002, pp. 49–
50; White, 2017). But we need not suppose that what happens here is he changes his 
mind, coming to think that convict should not have died. He can still think that the 
convict deserved to die and that the convict’s death was a good thing, he just wishes 
that he hadn’t been a part of it. In the rifleman’s case, there might be something 
revelatory: he might not know beforehand that he would come to regret killing the 
convict, and he might now also regret being part of the firing squad. Yet revelation is 
not the driving force of this example. What matters is that we can imagine he does 
feel agent-regret, and this is not explained by any new-found regret concerning the 
convict’s death.  
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One might also object that, even if the agent does not regret the result, there will be 
plenty of regrettable occurrences independent of the agent’s action that explain why 
the agent regrets what they have done. Perhaps I am being unduly strict in saying that 
it is results that carry the load for the standard picture, when instead what matters on 
the standard picture is that something regrettable concerning what happened explains 
agent-regret. For instance, we might say that the rifleman might regret that the convict 
acted in a way that deserved death, or the hate-filled driver might regret that the 
politician pursued such a bellicose and destructive policy that meant they deserved 
such hate; or we might say that death is always regrettable, no matter who dies. The 
proponent of the standard picture might say that such regrets explain the agent-regret 
each character feels. 
But I think it would be a mistake to try to save the standard picture in this way. Think 
about how our characters would respond to the event if they were not involved. The 
rifleman would be happy to see the convict shot by another firing squad, the hate-
filled driver would be content to hear the master of war is dead. Were they 
bystanders, neither would feel ordinary regret about the result. They might think 
there is nothing regrettable about these events. This suggests to me that they might 
not subscribe to the idea that every death is regrettable—and this strikes me as a 
plausible (if not pleasant) position to hold. So, such a thought cannot explain their 
feelings of agent-regret. 
Even if these characters do recognise there are regrettable elements in the vicinity of 
the result, the mere fact that something regrettable is present need not give our agents 
any reason to regret either the result or their own action. The rifleman might regret 
that the convict acted in such a way, but that is not the same as regretting the convict’s 
death. This applies to our agents when they consider their agency, too. The fact the 
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convict acted in a horrifying way simply does not explain why the rifleman might 
regret shooting the convict; after all, such a consideration is more likely to weigh as a 
justification for such an action. The fact the convict behaved appallingly is a reason 
to regret that the convict acted in such a way, it is not a reason for the rifleman to 
regret what he himself has done. Expanding our horizons to include the past horrible 
behaviour of the convict or the master of war does not give rise to ordinary regret 
about these deaths, we do not explain our characters’ agent-regret by appealing to 
such possible attendant regrets.13  
Following from these thoughts, one might wonder whether it is accurate to say that 
the rifleman would feel no regrets were he to think about this case impersonally. In 
fact, this point deserves some nuancing, and it gives me the opportunity to make an 
important point. My argument does not rely on imagining characters who are entirely 
egotistical, thinking that their own involvement is all that matters; rather, my argument 
is that it is agency, rather than what happens, that matters to agent-regret. Imagine 
that our rifleman is not selected for the firing squad, but a friend of his (who will 
make similar judgments that the convict’s death itself is not regrettable) is selected. 
Our rifleman might come to regret that his friend was implicated in a death in this 
way, or he might recognize (and appreciate) that his friend feels agent-regret. Still, if 
our rifleman thinks just about the convict’s death, he feels no regret. The impersonal 
regret concerning this scenario arises only if he thinks about the agency of those 
involved. To explain our rifleman’s regret that his friend was involved, we need to 
look to why (his friend’s) agency matters, given the lack of regret about the convict’s 
death.  
 
13 I’m grateful to both reviewers from this journal for very helpful comments here. 
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My point is this: absent their involvement, we can easily imagine either the rifleman 
or the hate-filled driver feeling no regret (or perhaps they feel only a sympathetic 
regret for other agents involved). What brings regret is agential involvement. But 
given that they would have no ordinary regrets were they not involved (or if they feel 
any regret, they feel regret for those who are implicated as agents), we need to look 
at something other than these results to explain their agent-regret. This is what we 
turn to in the next section.  
3. Evaluative Explanations 
For pure agent-regret to be comprehensible we need to understand why one might 
regret what one has done without regretting the result – why one might regret killing 
without regretting the death. The rifleman does not regret that the convict died.14 So, 
what is it that makes the rifleman regret killing the convict?15 Before focussing on 
agent-regret, I want to appeal to other cases where it matters to a person that they are 
implicated regardless of their assessment of the broader situation independent of 
their involvement. 
Take the example of a discovery. 16  This can be active or passive. By an active 
discovery, I have in mind someone like a scientist who wants to make a big 
discovery.17 We hope that such a scientist will think that the discovery is important 
regardless of her involvement, but it is also possible that she just wants to make the 
discovery herself and is indifferent to the broader interests of science. Maybe she 
 
14 It’s worth stating: this might seem repugnant to some of us. So be it. The fact is that some people, 
like our rifleman, believe that others deserve to die at the hands of the state. 
15 I will drop the discussion of the second-order regret - where our rifleman regrets his friend’s 
involvement - to avoid needlessly complicating this paper, but everything I say below could apply to 
such a case: the rifleman might, say, regret his friend’s involvement because of how involvement 
changes his friend’s identity. 
16 Tom Pink helped me to develop this with a very useful discussion. 
17 Williams discusses a case with some similarities (2002, pp. 141–142). 
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wants fame, maybe she is like the mountaineer who wants to be the first to scale a 
particular peak but who doesn’t think there is any value (for her) in anybody else 
scaling it first. The mountaineer might think her own endeavours are important but 
not care about the endeavours of other mountaineers, our scientist might take just 
the same attitude towards science. She would be an odd figure, but a comprehensible 
one. 
Discoveries can also be passive. One can overhear or be told something without 
seeking it out. Sometimes, it can be a very good thing that someone has discovered 
some fact, but it can be a great burden upon the person who discovers it, and they 
might wish that they hadn’t been the one to find out. Take, for instance, a whistle-
blower who overhears a politician cut a crooked deal. The whistle-blower might think 
that it is a very good thing that someone knows about this corruption and can start 
the process to remove this corrupt politician, but the burden upon the whistle-blower 
is immense. Or one might find out about a friend’s extramarital affair and face the 
difficult situation of confronting the friend or potentially telling their spouse.  
These examples involve discovering something, but the point does not rest upon 
anything particular about discovery. The point is simply that someone can be glad or 
dismayed that they are implicated in some event when their assessment of that event, 
regarded independently of their involvement, differs; they might not be glad if it 
occurs but glad if they are implicated, or they might be dismayed that they are 
implicated when they would be glad were the event to implicate somebody else 
instead. Our assessments can differ depending on whether we are implicated, so it 
should be no real surprise, then, if our evaluations of our actions sometimes come 
apart from our evaluations of the result regarded independently of our actions. I will 
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now offer two evaluative explanations of why one might regret one’s action that do 
not turn upon one’s assessment of a result.  
Firstly, we find a plausible evaluative explanation elsewhere in Williams’s other work. 
What lurks behind much of Williams’s work, and what has not been commented on 
in much of the discussion of agent-regret, is the importance of performing certain 
actions - where certain actions depend upon certain results, including unintended 
results - regardless of one’s independent assessment of the results and regardless of 
one’s assessment of one’s own decision procedure. Part of what Williams wanted to 
show was that what we have done is important to our sense of ourselves as agents (B. 
Williams, 1981, pp. 29–30). And surely something like this thought is what underpins 
Williams’s (1973a, sec. 5) famous integrity objection. There is something important, 
not least to Jim, about whether it is Pedro or Jim who kills the captive in the jungle. 
And we might not make things much easier for Jim (so long as he is averse to violence) 
if we imagine that the captive is someone whom Jim hates or wishes dead. 
We can better understand integrity cases by reflection on a parallel sort of case: 
revenge. Shylock might be wryly amused were Antonio to lose a pound of flesh; he 
might even be satisfied to some extent were someone else to cut it from Antonio; but 
for full satisfaction Shylock must cut the flesh himself because he seeks revenge due 
to how badly Antonio has treated him and, to redress this, he must inflict the injury 
himself.18 Or take the example of Inigo Montoya in The Princess Bride. For half his 
life he has been waiting to say to his father’s killer: ‘Hello. My name is Inigo Montoya. 
You killed my father. Prepare to die’. Montoya would not be content to learn that his 
father’s killer has died. Montoya doesn’t merely want him dead, he wants to kill him. 
 




Revenge seems to be achieved, at least in many cases, only if I – the person who seeks 
revenge - achieve it. And the evaluative judgments we make of the result and the 
action can differ: Montoya might regret his father’s killer’s death at someone else’s 
hands, but he relishes killing him himself. What we do, and that we do it, can matter 
to us independently of the result. 
Integrity cases suggest that who performs an action can be important aside from what 
result is realized. Revenge cases show us that sometimes it matters who brings about 
a desired result. The pure cases of agent-regret that I am exploring are similar insofar 
as they also turn around the idea that it isn’t what happens that matters, it’s that I did 
it.  
The second sort of evaluative explanation comes from a point raised by John 
Gardner (2018) and Tony Honoré (1999): what we do – including what we do 
unintentionallly – affects our identities. Our actions, in part, make us who we are. 
This is a deep and complicated issue - just how do our actions affect our identities, 
which actions do this, and just why should we care about this? - and it is an issue I 
cannot fully explore here. But surely our actions do sometimes affect our identities, 
and this might provide a further explanation of why we care about what we do. Let 
me just try to sketch the idea. 
Raimond Gaita discusses a Dutch woman who hates Hitler most of all for making ‘a 
murderess of her’: she was in a plot to assassinate him and had to turn three Jews out 
of her protection so as not to risk the plot. They were killed (Gaita, 2004, p. 43). 
Although she clearly regrets the death of those she was protecting, one can also 
recognise a self-focussed element.19 It is not just what happens that matters, but what 
 
19 The Dutch woman can be seen as being in an Agamemnon-type case: throw out her protectees or 
be discovered. Although her case nicely illustrates my point about identity, she also raises 
18 
 
performing these actions does to somebody’s own sense of who they are. She is now, 
in her own eyes, a murderess. To apply this thought to our examples:  the rifleman 
and the hate-filled driver are now killers.20 For the rifleman, what matters might be 
how killing the convict changes the rifleman himself. The rifleman does not regret 
the death of the convict in itself: he regrets killing the convict because in killing the 
convict he becomes a killer (Dan-Cohen, 1991, p. 984; Raz, 2011, pp. 234–235). The 
same thought applies to the hate-filled driver. 
Now, one might worry that to see being a killer as a bad thing, as something that might 
make one’s action regrettable, one must see the results of one’s killing as a bad thing. 
But I think that would be a mistake. To adapt an example from Les Misérables, Jean 
Valjean might think that being a thief is a shameful thing, even though he does not 
think there was anything shameful in his particular case where taking the loaf of bread 
was necessary to feed his starving sister. The rifleman might think that being a killer 
is a bad thing, and he is now a killer, although he does not think that the death of the 
convict was a bad thing. This is comprehensible if we grant that we might make rough-
grained evaluations of having certain traits, or being certain ways, that do not 
necessarily track our evaluations of all the particulars involved. Being a killer might 
be bad because the results of a killing are usually bad, or because others regard killers 
 
complications that extend to cases like Agamemnon’s. The Dutch woman clearly does care about 
those who she protected, and she deeply regrets their deaths. But think about Agamemnon and 
imagine that he does not care about killing his daughter, nor would he care if his fleet were to die, he 
might still care that he becomes a killer, or he might care that he becomes a traitor. The complications 
that arise are that he does not, by some bad luck become a killer, rather he chooses to become a killer. 
As I have said, I think this adds several layers of detail that require a discussion beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
20 Perhaps each has already killed. In which case, we can nuance the identity claim: I regret being 
someone who has killed several times. The way in which one kills, and the circumstances surrounding 
it, might also subtly alter our identities. Thanks to Luke Elson for this. 
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(no matter the details of what went on) as somehow tainted; this does not mean that 
every such death must be seen as bad.21 Still, one is a killer and that is a bad thing. 
So, we see that it is sometimes important who performs an action (irrespective of our 
evaluations of the result), and that what we do might affect our identities in important 
ways, and that these are plausible explanations of why the evaluations one makes of 
what one has done need not depend on one’s evaluations of the result. Thus, we see 
two evaluative explanations of why we might regret what we have done without 
regretting the result itself. And this is not meant to be an exhaustive account of the 
various evaluative explanations that might explain why one regrets one’s action; we 
can proceed with what we have whilst recognising that there might be other 
explanations that we can add to further bolster the plausibility of pure cases and to 
better understand how agency matters. 
Perhaps a proponent of the standard picture of agent-regret might fight back at this 
point. They might say something like: ‘Ah! If what you do affects who you are, then 
we have a result: being a killer… and that is what explains the agent’s agent-regret.’ 
But this is not a result in the sense used by the standard picture. The result to which 
the standard picture appeals to explain agent-regret is, say, the death. To move to the 
idea that the result which explains agent-regret is that the rifleman becomes a killer 
concedes my point. If we grant that the effect on their identity is what explains our 
characters’ agent-regret, we put evaluative explanations that focus on agency, rather 
than outcomes like the death, in the driving seat. 
One might also worry that the evaluative explanations I have appealed to in sketching 
pure cases lack a certain explanatory force that the standard picture has. Namely, the 
 
21 It is also possible that the rifleman hates being a killer solely because of the way it affects how others 
interact with him. His mother might hug him just a little less tight because she sees him as a killer. 
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standard picture explains variance: why we might regret some things but not others 
and why agent-regret can vary in intensity. For instance, you might not feel agent-
regret over lightly brushing against someone in a crowded train carriage, but you 
might feel agent-regret if you break their nose. Further, this will be far weaker than 
the regret that the lorry driver feels. On the standard picture, we can say that some 
results are more important than others, so some results justify agent-regret, and the 
more important the result the deeper the regret. When it comes to cases of pure 
agent-regret, results do not play this explanatory role. Yet my account still can explain 
variance for pure cases. For instance, some identity-affecting factors are more 
important than others (anyone would rather be a nose-breaker than a killer, but better 
not to be a nose-breaker at all), some actions do not affect our identities, and 
sometimes it is more important than other times that a particular person performs a 
task. Why? Well, that will greatly depend on the details of the case; what matters is 
that we can see that these factors can vary in importance in a way that might explain 
variance. 
Too often philosophers accept a misguided account of agent-regret: they recognise 
that there’s something more than just regretting results and they see that Williams is 
on to something, but they focus on the bad result of ordinary regret.  Rather than 
accepting the standard picture, we should accept the simple picture I have offered. 
The simple picture just says that agent-regret involves regretting what you have done, 
it does not hold that a particular evaluative explanation based on results is central to 
agent-regret. To explain agent-regret we need to explain why our actions matter in 
the first place, and why we might think that our actions are regrettable. Sometimes 
we cannot do this just by appealing to one’s regret of the result, as the standard picture 
does. My hope is that we can reach a clearer understanding of the nature of agent-
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regret which might result in a more interesting exploration of the variety of 
explanations of why one might regret what one has done. 
4. Care 
To end, I want to explore what this tells us about those who feel agent-regret. There 
is a popular, and to my mind plausible, understanding of the emotions on which care 
and emotional reactions go hand-in-hand (Anderson, 1995; Helm, 2009; Jaworska, 
2007; Kolodny, 2003; Scheffler, 2011; Tannenbaum, 2007; Wallace, 2013, pp. 22–
32). The fact I am ashamed, angry, or feel guilty shows that I care, in some way, about 
the object of my emotion; likewise, if I care about something then I will be angry if 
someone needlessly damages it or I will be happy if it flourishes. If this is right, then 
what we feel agent-regret about will reveal something about what we care about. The 
rifleman’s regret is self-centred. He doesn’t regret the result that the convict died. He 
regrets that he killed someone. This is what he cares about.  
This leads into a criticism we sometimes find of agent-regret, namely that it is 
‘improperly self-regarding’, given that ‘the agent is focused on himself rather than the 
child—as if what he regretted was that he was involved in the death of the child rather 
than the death of the child’ (Tannenbaum, 2007, p. 53, my emphasis)?22 Self-regard 
is not always problematic; take ‘narcissism’ to be an improper level of self-regard.23 
Is the rifleman narcissistic, and does my analysis – where elements concerning the 
 
22 Tannenbaum’s own account tries to avoid imputing narcissism to agent-regret, but in doing so she 
might presuppose the standard picture. For example, in discussing the lorry driver: he ‘is focused on 
himself, his action, and the child’ (Tannenbaum, 2007, p. 55) This is true for the standard lorry driver 
case, as I say below; but I also will argue that in the rifleman’s case we need not see his agent-regret as 
improperly self-regarding even though he is not focussed on the victim. 
23 I use this term in an everyday, rather than clinical, sense. 
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agent’s identity, or the agent’s own role, can carry the load – mean that agent-regret, 
as an emotion, is fundamentally narcissistic?24 
Whether or not an agent should ever feel agent-regret, we should not base any 
opposition to agent-regret on the charge that it is narcissistic. Think about what we 
ought to care about. It’s true that in the purest case of agent-regret we care not about 
what happened, but about what we have done. But sometimes that is okay. It’s at best 
arguable whether the rifleman should care about the convict, yet he clearly should 
care about his own role in the world. The worry about narcissism comes out more 
potently when we think that there is something else the agent should care about, like 
if the lorry driver didn’t care about the dead child. It is worth pointing out here that 
in most cases of agent-regret there will be a variety of explanations of why an agent 
evaluates her action as bad. The Dutch woman from Gaita’s example was concerned 
that she was made into a murderess by releasing the Jewish protectees, but this was 
not her only concern: she cared also about the victims. So, there is no reason why 
the lorry driver must regret his role rather than the death of the child; he might regret 
both things. As long as he regrets the death of the child sufficiently, it is not improper 
to feel agent-regret, nor is it improper to also be concerned with how he has become 
a killer. It would only be improper were he to relegate the child’s importance too 
much and were he to demonstrate too much concern for himself. But the problem 
here would not be with my account of agent-regret, or our general proclivity to feel 
it, the problem would be with what the driver cares about. 
Agent-regret does not have to be narcissistic. Yet my point in this paper has been to 
emphasise how agent-regret will greatly implicate the agent and will involve some deal 
 
24 See also (Rorty, 1980, p. 501) 
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of care about one’s own agency. This is one of the fundamental lessons Williams 
tried to bring out with agent-regret and in his other work. This feature is brought out 
in lucid clarity in a haunting piece by Alice Gregory (2017) in The New Yorker, that 
examines the lives of several people who have accidentally killed someone. In it, we 
find the story of ‘Patricia’, who hit a motorcyclist: 
A truck driver came upon the scene and pulled Patricia away from 
the body. ‘I couldn’t understand what was happening,’ she 
recalled. ‘He started praying, but he was praying for me. I heard 
him say, ‘God, protect her. God, look out for her. God, give her 
strength.’ At that point, I just completely broke down.’  
What is important to recognise - what this truck driver recognised - is that doing 
something as momentous as killing another person clearly affects the agent, and we 
must focus on the agent’s life as well as the victim’s. We care about what we have 
done: those who kill often care that they have killed. This is true for the rifleman, 
even though he does not care about the person he killed. And it is perhaps so much 
the worse for those like Williams’s lorry driver or Patricia who care not just about 
being killers but also about the valuable life they have taken away from the world.
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